# COMBATTING MODERN SLAVERY AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

IN ALLIED DEFENCE STRATEGIES

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
University of
Nottingham
Rights Lab

Independent
Anti-Slavery
Commissioner

Authorship and Acknowledgements

The Rights Lab, University of Nottingham

The Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham is the world's largest, leading group of modern slavery researchers. Through their four research programmes, they deliver new and cutting-edge research that provides rigorous data, evidence and discoveries for the global anti-slavery effort. Their impact team provides an interface between the Rights Lab research programmes and civil society, business and government, and the INSPIRE project elevates survivor-informed research as a key part of knowledge production to help end slavery.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner

The role of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, its functions and powers were established in the landmark Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA). This charges the Commissioner with encouraging good practice sharing amongst all those with a role to play in tackling every aspect of modern slavery and human trafficking in the UK. The role is independent of government, allowing the Commissioner to scrutinise and report on the effectiveness of policies and actions taken to prevent exploitation, support and protect victims, and bring perpetrators to justice.

The Commissioner also supports the carrying out of research to improve our understanding of modern slavery and how it can best be tackled. The Commissioner works across the UK with government departments, public authorities, the sector, businesses, and law enforcement to pursue these goals.

List of Acronyms

APPG	All-Party Parliamentary Group
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CPS	UK Crown Prosecution Service
CTHB	Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
CTIP PMO	Combating Trafficking in Persons Program Management Office
DFAT	Dep. of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Australia
HS	Human Security
ITPP	Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (NATO)
MoD	United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
MSHT	Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSPD	US National Security Presidential Directive
OSD	Office of US Secretary of Defense
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSR/CTHB	Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (in the OSCE)
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Assault
SFIP	Strategic Framework Implementation Plan
SOM	Smuggling of Migrants
TIP Report	United States Department of State Annual Trafficking in Persons Report
TVPA (2000)	United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act
U.S. DoD	United States Department of Defense
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Combatant Command
WPS	Women Peace & Security

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Introduction

The exploitation of individuals through modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) in and around armed conflict is a long-standing but often overlooked element of warfare. While its historical roots are well-established, policy and research addressing the use of MSHT by armed actors, both state and non-state, remain limited and underdeveloped. An analysis of 171 armed conflicts between 1989 and 2016 revealed that at least 87% involved some form of enslavement by armed groups, underscoring its widespread and strategic use.[1] MSHT is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a tool of war.

Terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Shabaab, as well as state-affiliated forces like the Somali federal security forces and Russia-backed forces, have systemically employed MSHT to achieve military, economic, and ideological objectives. The use of MSHT by adversarial forces poses a direct threat to allied missions and global security more broadly. It enables the operational capabilities of violent extremist organisations, perpetuates instability, and risks moral and psychological harm to allied service members. Moreover, there is a critical and underexplored risk that allied personnel may intentionally or inadvertently contribute to the demand for trafficking, as seen in historical cases involving international military deployments. For instance, in the 1990s and early 2000s, U.S. military bases in South Korea became hubs for sex trafficking.[2] Similarly, UN and NATO deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo were linked to a rise in trafficked women and girls.[3][4]

These are two fundamental concerns that drive this report and highlight the need for counter MSHT training in the military. First, to ensure that service members are not part of the problem (knowingly or not). Second, to understand how modern slavery and human trafficking pose potential threats to allied forces, missions, and operational security. Our aims for this report are to support the synthesis and sharing of approaches, best practices, and lessons learned by drawing on the perspectives of experts in the field from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD), United States Department of Defense (DoD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) so that allied defence personnel may better counter MSHT.

This report was commissioned by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner to align with their Strategic Plan goal of promoting collaborative, whole-of-society approaches to combat exploitation and enhance collective understanding of modern slavery. Informed by case studies and expert interviews, this report provides insights into the ways in which defence actors can function as both risk mitigators and agents of change in the fight against MSHT.

Slavery as a weapon of war

Slavery is increasingly used as a weapon of war by terrorist groups and, in some cases, state security forces through forced labour, sexual exploitation, and the use of child soldiers. As defence forces operate in complex environments, they risk enabling or encountering such abuses.

- **Islamic State.** In the case of ISIS, slavery was a critical component of military strategy and tactics, and was used to fund and conduct its operations.[5] In 2014, ISIS commercialised the practice of enslavement and was making $2 million a day from slavery, establishing the practice as a key revenue stream.[6] ISIS sold enslaved women on online auctions to generate income and gave them as gifts to incentivize their fighters; captured men were used as forced labour; and enslaved children bolstered their ranks. Beyond tactics and revenue, slavery reflected the culture within the Islamic State, as it was grounded and justified by both religious and sovereign defence rationalizations.[7]

- **Somalia**. In Somalia, both al-Shabaab and the Somali federal and regional security forces have recruited and used child soldiers.[8] Al Shabaab continues to use human trafficking in "direct hostilities and military support roles," and "...exploits women and girls in sexual slavery and force marriage to al-Shabaab militants."[9] Somalia and Russia are named on the U.S. State Department's Child Soldiers Prevention Act List as governments whose governmental or government-supported armed forces, police or other security forces recruit or use child soldiers.[10] Since the list's implementation in 2010, Somalia has been included every year for fifteen years, and Russia consecutively for three years since 2022.[11]

- **Russia.** On Russian soil, the Russian government perpetuates the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPPK) exploitation of North Koreans in forced labour and repatriates victims who escape back to the DPPK where they are highly vulnerable to being re-trafficked. Since invading Ukraine in 2014, Russian-led forces and government-backed armed groups have used child soldiers in combat and support roles and forced foreign national adults to fight in Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. Russian-led forces have reportedly forced Syrian children to fight in Libya, and the Wagner group, a private military organization funded by the Russian government, has reportedly used child soldiers in Central African Republic.[12]

Executive Summary

- The British Military, alongside allied US and European forces, recognise that protecting human rights and confronting modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) are critical to global security. They identify MSHT as a major human security threat that undermines humanitarian efforts and jeopardises military operations. They know that MSHT exists within and exacerbates the majority of contemporary conflicts.

- Across partner militaries and organisations, the absence of agreed-upon training standards and shared vocabulary creates challenges. Training content is often reactive, driven by political shifts or isolated events, leading to ongoing changes that undermine consistency, interoperability, and long-term capacity building. Within the UK, training on MSHT can be fragmented with different teams operating in silos, often using inconsistent terminology and varied content. This can result in duplication, gaps, and confusion and reduce the overall effectiveness of training efforts.

- A strategic, survivor-informed, and operationally integrated 'culture' is needed that treats MSHT not only as a human rights issue but as a core security and operational threat. One that can be implemented through a centralised coordination of MSHT policy within defence structures; integration into strategic planning, doctrine, and operations; and the recognition of human security as a strategic enabler essential to achieving mission success.

- Service members should be trained on how to recognise indicators of MSHT, which may provide more information on the adversaries they face and how to counter them. They need to know how to respond to situations like child soldiers and sex trafficking in a way that mitigates harm to victims, themselves, and their mission. They must also know how to refer victims to organisations that can help them, and they must be able to report what they see to inform mission planning.

- An effective training programme on MSHT within a defence context should be specialised, scenario-driven, and scalable. It must equip high-risk roles such as recruiters, medics, and law enforcement personnel with realistic, simulation-based training that reflects the complexity of MSHT situations. Central to this approach is a victim-centred, 'do no harm' ethos, incorporating key principles like non-punishment and the "social path" to support victims. Training should also be scalable through 'Training of Trainers' models to ensure consistent knowledge transfer across units. Finally, it must embed robust reporting mechanisms and clearly demonstrate how addressing MSHT is essential to operational effectiveness and institutional integrity.

Recommendations and considerations

This section outlines a series of practical recommendations and considerations aimed at strengthening the UK's defence response to MSHT, with a particular focus on supporting the UK and MOD in enhancing its human security work through the lens of emerging international best practices.

1. **An international approach to tackling MSHT**. The IASC should act as a strategic convener to translate international defence best practices on MSHT into actionable national and local measures. By leveraging the insights and relationships outlined in this report, the IASC should look to how it can facilitate and support engagement and alignment between UK policy and leading international standards.

2. **Strengthen MOD capacity and leadership on counter-MSHT through institutional investment**. To reinforce and advance its leadership in addressing MSHT within military operations, MOD should build on its existing human security framework by expanding the mandate and joint operational capability of the Human Security Outreach Group; increasing the annual number of trained Human Security Advisors across services; and allocating dedicated resources for the development and delivery of specialised human security and counter-MSHT training and operational tools.

3. **Strengthen training, operational guidance, and resource sharing across allied defence organisations on MSHT.** To enhance collective preparedness and effectiveness in countering MSHT, the UK could consider working with allied defence organisations to build a more consistent, interoperable, and victim-centred training and operational framework. This might be achieved through the following suggested actions:

   o The UK could develop and adopt a standardised, legally grounded definition of MSHT to support clarity across defence and civilian institutions. A shared definition could improve operational consistency, aid coordination, and enhance the ability to recognise, report, and respond to MSHT cases in both domestic and international settings.

   o The UK could explore a formal partnership with the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings to incorporate simulation-based, scenario-driven training into national and MOD-specific programmes. This partnership could also support the integration of victim-centred approaches, such as the "social path" framework and non-punishment principles, helping to align UK defence responses with emerging international best practice.

o The UK could lead or participate in regular, collaborative workshops with key partners to develop tactical-level SOPs and training tools. These workshops could address the distinct operational needs of different service branches. This collaboration could include producing tailored resources for key defence roles, drawing on shared experience and aligning with allied standards to improve training quality and consistency across operational contexts

o Explore the development of a centralised counter-MSHT resource hub A central digital hub could be created to share training materials, SOPs, case studies, and institutional guidance from the MOD and international partners. Drawing inspiration from DoD learning platforms, this hub could support interoperability, help scale best practices and promote shared learning across allied forces.

4. **Explore strategic research partnerships on Human Security and MSHT.** The MOD could consider developing formal partnerships with specialist research institutions, such as the Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Slavery in War, to support sustained, high-impact research that informs policy, operational planning, and training. These partnerships could also explore comparative studies on sexual violence in defence settings, including the interconnections between Military Sexual Trauma (MST), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), and MSHT. This would help identify systemic drivers, enable evidence-based prevention strategies, and promote accountability and cultural change across UK and allied armed forces.

Methodology

This report is based on qualitative research conducted on relevant defence and government policies, training tools, academic literature, news articles, and reports from non-governmental organisations and security organisations. and nine semi-structured interviews with experts from the MOD, DoD, NATO, and OSCE who are actively engaged in counter-MSHT policy, training, and operational work.

These included personnel involved in human security policy and training delivery in MOD, the CTIP Program Management Office and Indo-Pacific Command's Women, Peace and Security Office at DoD and a subject matter expert from the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

Each interview was conducted for a minimum of one hour with a series of questions on how the key informants and their organisations approach counter-MSHT efforts and training, best practices, and lessons learned. Following a synthesis of all the interviews, the following key concepts emerged:

1. **Metacognition:** This refers to how key leaders and their organisations understand and frame the role of allied defence personnel in combating MSHT—shaped by the terms they use, the policies they follow, and how they prioritise MSHT within broader security and human rights goals. This foundational understanding influences how strategies are developed and applied in practice.

2. **Training and operationalisation:** This detail the tools, methods, and institutional mechanisms used to equip personnel with counter-MSHT knowledge and apply it in operational contexts. This includes how training is disseminated, adapted, and assessed, as well as gaps, challenges, and lessons learned.

The findings were then organised into four case studies: (1) MOD, (2) DoD, (3) NATO, and (4) OSCE. Each case study includes a unique approach to the ways in which allied defence personnel counter MSHT and together offer a comprehensive look at best practices. At the start of each case study a summary is given to how the UK MOD efforts may use the lessons learned from each case study both nationally, and internationally. A comparative study can be found at Annex A.

This research does not assess training quality, nor does it cover supply chain or sexual exploitation issues due to scope limitations. Using the UK MOD as a primary case study, it draws from expert insights to highlight best practices, while acknowledging that definitions and responses to MSHT vary across defence organisations. This report is a snapshot of current practices and is intended to support policy development and awareness.

Case study summary

Case Study 1: UK Ministry of Defence

The UK MOD integrates counter-MSHT as one of six themes within its broader human security policy, which has been under development since 2020. Its approach combines three key frameworks: assessing operations through "3 vantage points" (civilian impact and adherence to international norms), applying the "4Rs" (Recognize, Respond, Report, Refer) to guide service members' actions, and maintaining a focus on humanising missions. These strategies are supported by the Human Security Network, multidisciplinary training at the Defence Academy, and expert guidance from the Outreach Group.

Case Study 2: U.S. Department of Defense

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a comprehensive Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) program, including a dedicated office, mandatory biennial training, and unique reporting protocols. Eight specialised online courses are available for high-risk roles like law enforcement and healthcare. DoD personnel can report trafficking violations through multiple channels, including the chain of command, law enforcement, and the DoD Inspector General. While the main focus is on preventing service member involvement, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) integrates a Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) approach to enhance CTIP efforts. A WPS approach[13] increases understanding on the root causes of TIP and strengthens CTIP efforts. The INDOPACOM Office of WPS operationalises CTIP efforts through both internal training and multinational cooperation to promote prevention and effective response.

Case Study 3: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO's Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB) policy is part of its broader human security agenda, which also includes preventing sexual violence, protecting civilians and children in conflict, and safeguarding cultural property. Although CTHB is a central concern, its integration within multiple overlapping policy areas makes it difficult to prioritise and allocate focused resources. NATO offers guidance and online training on CTHB but cannot enforce compliance among member states, limiting its ability to ensure uniform implementation.

Case Study 4: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE combats trafficking in human beings (CTHB) through a cross-dimensional approach spanning political-military, economic-environmental, and human rights efforts. Its Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for CTHB (OSR/CTHB) leads policy coordination, international cooperation, and best practice development to enhance national responses. Key principles include a victim-centred focus, such as the "non-punishment principle" and support for survivors' recovery. The OSCE is a leader in developing and implementing CTHB training with specialties in maritime, mixed migration flows, and conflict settings. The OSR/CTHB offers multiple training platforms to include in person, online, training of trainer programs, and an innovative simulated-based training approach that improves CTHB responses.

Case Study 1: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD)

MOD demonstrates a strong foundation in human security and counter-MSHT through its accumulated experience and the expertise of key personnel. To build on this progress, it could expand the role and joint capability of the Outreach Group, increase the number of trained Human Security Advisors, allocate targeted resources for human security and counter-MSHT training and tools, and foster deeper collaboration with partner and allied defence organisations. These actions will reinforce and advance the MOD's leadership in addressing modern slavery and human trafficking within military operations.

Part 1: Metacognition

Terms and Definitions

In the UK, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 consolidates legislation on MSHT and defines each term.[14] While the terms "modern slavery" and "human trafficking" are often used interchangeably, in general, the UK government sees modern slavery as encompassing: human trafficking, slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour. The UK government uses the UN definition of "human trafficking" from the Palermo Protocol: "recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of threat, or use of force, coercion or deception…to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (UN, 2000, Art. 3)." In UK law the definition of "exploitation" is not limited and therefore, "…trafficking includes sexual exploitation, forced and bonded labour, domestic servitude, any form of slavery and removal of organs." The primary components of human trafficking are: act, means, and purpose. All components are required for a crime to be considered human trafficking, except when a victim is a child. Children cannot give informed consent and therefore no identification of "means" is necessary.[15]

The MOD utilises the UK legal definitions of modern slavery and human trafficking while also aligning with NATO's definition of "trafficking in human beings":

> "That is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation."[16]

The term "modern slavery" is more often used in the UK. In bilateral or multilateral settings, NATO terms like "trafficking in human beings," or simply, "human trafficking" are more applicable. As one interviewee explained, "Whenever I work predominantly

in Europe, or sometimes when we've gone to Africa to teach on this as well, the term 'modern slavery' is a very British term. So, I have to change all my phrases to 'trafficking in human beings' in line with NATO and the UN. Sometimes I have to read my audience over which phraseology would land better even though it's talking the same talk."

The problem of many variant terms and definitions for modern slavery and human trafficking is a global problem (exacerbated by the nuances of many languages). There is a growing agreed consensus on the operational and legal definition found in the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery.[17] However ninety-four countries have no law against slavery.[18]

Policy Integration

Many of the rules touching on human rights activity are set out in Joint Service Publications that contain instructional and regulatory rules and guidance. They are not law, but failing to adhere to them can have consequences that are as serious as breaking the law. They are best understood as rules with stated expectations for those under their remit. The primary Joint Service Publication (JSP) for the MOD on MSHT is JSP 985 *Human Security in Defence*. MOD policy places MSHT within its larger policy on "human security." JSP 985 instructs UK Defence to "incorporate human security considerations in all that it does," because it is the right thing to do, morally, legally, and strategically. Considering strategic implications, "adopting a human security approach can be a force multiplier, strengthening our legitimacy to act and our ability to deliver mission objectives." The term "human security" refers to the populations around which the MOD operates, and a human security approach includes consideration of six "cross-cutting themes" (CCT). These are themes which may entrench, exacerbate, or perpetuate instability and conflict.

 The six cross-cutting themes of MoD human security are:

- Protection of Civilians
- Women, Peace & Security (including Conflict-Related Sexual Violence & SEA)
- Modern Slavery & Human Trafficking
- Children Affected by Armed Conflict/Youth Peace & Security
- Building Integrity/Countering Corruption
- Cultural Property Protection[19]

As noted in JSP 985, "These CCTs map onto one or more of the HS factors and are thematically categorised issues that can exacerbate, perpetuate, or entrench conflict/instability or are an intended or unintentional outcome of conflict, military action, or instability. The UK CCTs are closely aligned to those of NATO's Human Security unit."[20] The MOD is currently undergoing two internal evaluations on their operationalisation of human security within their 12-year plan initiated in 2020.[21]

Concerning MOD personnel actions, JSP 769 *Zero Tolerance to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)* [22] forbids sexual exploitation and abuse particularly in situations of

extreme power imbalance. The JSP specifies a breadth of behaviours and actions and applies to all "Defence people who are overseas working or carrying out any other activity on behalf of Defence: this includes members of the regular forces, reserve forces and civilians who are employed by Defence."[23] This policy was published in 2022 and is the first time that across all three services—British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force—there is a consistent prohibition, banning Defence personnel from using sex workers abroad.[24]

Individual and Organisational Perspectives: Understanding MSHT Challenges and their Importance to Defence Personnel

In MOD interviews the key informants were from three distinct parts of the British military that are conducting counter-MSHT work. Each informant is an expert with 16-38 years of experience on, or related to, the topic and they are currently serving in primary implementation roles. The perspectives captured in this section are drawn from three highly experienced professionals, each operating in a distinct area of defence policy and training. Their insights collectively represent the civilian strategic level, the operational and educational domain, and the mission-focused, deployable military unit. Their diverse vantage points offer a comprehensive picture of how human security and MSHT concerns are integrated into British defence operations.

From the perspective of one interviewee, human security was seen as being framed as a "hard security" concern. This framing recognises that MSHT and broader human security issues directly affect military effectiveness, legitimacy, and strategic outcomes. The approach is structured around three core vantage points:

- **Vantage Point 1: Military Conduct and Civilian Impact**
  The first consideration focuses on how military operations and conduct affect civilian populations. Harm to civilians can delegitimise missions, reduce local support, and provoke resentment that may empower adversaries. This dynamic has been witnessed in various operational theatres, such as Somalia, where abuses by local partner forces led communities to prefer insurgent groups perceived as more protective. Acknowledging this, the MOD emphasizes the importance of minimising civilian harm not only for humanitarian reasons but also to maintain operational legitimacy and strategic advantage.

- **Vantage Point 2: Adversary Exploitation of the Civilian Domain**
  A second lens evaluates how adversaries exploit the civilian environment to further their goals. This includes practices such as torture, sexual violence, forced displacement, and the use of MSHT to destabilize regions and control populations. For example, occupying forces may weaponize citizenship such as forcing Ukrainians in occupied areas to adopt Russian passports to access basic services resources, or even food supply chains such as the use of torture and sexual violence to the capture and control of grain supplies. Defence personnel must be trained to recognise such patterns and intervene effectively particularly when these actions involve child soldiers, forced labour, or mass

displacement, all of which compound human suffering and complicate military engagement.

- **Vantage Point 3: Reinforcing the Rules-Based International Order**
  Finally, human security is also positioned as a tool for supporting and amplifying the rules-based international order. This vantage point highlights the value of collaboration with allies, the UN, and international institutions in confronting MSHT globally. Human security concerns, including MSHT, are increasingly viewed not as peripheral humanitarian issues, but as central to sustainable peace and stability. This approach asks defence forces to go beyond kinetic operations and contribute to broader efforts in diplomacy, training, and international cooperation.

From Vantage Point 1, any service member involved with MSHT risks the legitimacy of the mission, the military, and any allied nation, in addition to individual legal ramifications and the human rights violations endured by MSHT victims. This Vantage Point requires allied service members to not only think about their actions, but that of their partners. As one interviewee discussed, the abuses committed by the Somali National Army on civilians led locals to instead support Al Shabab. From a security standpoint, not only does MSHT risk impact on combat effectiveness, the mission, and legitimacy, but also has an impact on individual allied service members that witness crimes committed by a partner force.

There can be a moral injury toll that can weigh on service members who witness atrocities like MSHT but can do nothing to intervene. An interviewee described experiences in Afghanistan where there were cases of partner forces, the Afghan National Police and Border Guard units, enslaving young boys. He explained how chains of command did not know how to effectively address these situations and instead responded with informal advice that dismissed these crimes as part of the "culture." As a result, they said, "there was a whole issue that came out of that on moral injury, because troops afterwards were coming away thinking, that was terrible, I should have done something, then they beat themselves up about it later."

Reflecting on deployment experience in Afghanistan, an interviewee noted that repeated short-term approaches led to re-learning the same lessons and, at times, caused avoidable harm: "Some say we weren't in Afghanistan for 10 years, but one year 10 times. Short-term thinking and repeated re-learning meant we often sought military solutions to human, political, and social problems—and caused unnecessary harm by failing to follow the 'do no harm' principle."

Building on this perspective, Vantage Point 2 encourages consideration of how adversaries may weaponize modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) to advance their operations. This raises urgent questions: How are allied defence personnel trained to recognize and respond to the use of MSHT by adversaries? How are they prepared to confront the presence of child soldiers or navigate the ethical and operational complexities of MSHT-related scenarios? What are the consequences of

both action and inaction in such contexts, and how can victim safety be prioritized alongside combat objectives?

For Vantage Point 3, the message is clear—there needs to be regular communication and collaboration across allied militaries and defence institutions to combat MSHT. Combating MSHT together enforces the international rules-based system that demands freedom for all.

The three-vantage point framework is a simple and straightforward way to articulate why human security training is necessary to achieving any mission and it provides direction for policy and training development. The three vantage points are the starting point for a human security perspective that can be applied in mission planning and execution, training and exercises, as well as policy development and integration.

An interviewee emphasised a mission-focused approach of Outreach Group rooted in three core principles: humanise the situation, keep the mission end state in view, and support the commander's goal of "winning the war and the peace." These principles are meant to be applied together, balancing empathy with strategic outcomes to enhance both operational success and long-term stability. Applying this and the vantage points provides an abundance of ways to understand and articulate the importance of defence personnel training on human security.

Part 2: Training and Operationalisation

Training and Operationalisation Fundamentals

Each interviewee clearly articulated the security relevance and necessity of training defence personnel on countering MSHT. In the MOD context, this training is currently integrated within the larger human security framework. While it is helpful from a strategic and policy perspective to continually frame MSHT challenges within the three human security vantage points, when in challenging situations on the ground or possible MSHT scenarios, service members need something more refined to guide their next steps.

The UK MOD utilizes the "4Rs" to provide guidance to service members encountering potential human security violations:

1. **Recognise**
2. **Respond**
3. **Report**
4. **Refer**

To empower forces to **"Recognise"** potential HS risks requires multiple levels of training, planning considerations, briefings, and incorporation of a HS feedback loop into the ever-evolving operational environment picture. This robust approach is essential for seamless integration of human security analysis throughout a

deployment. It is not, however, unwieldy or a significant tax on resources, as it uses pre-existing systems and infrastructure. JSP 985 "Human Security in Defence," describes how defence forces are prepared to "Recognise" potential HS risks before they deploy through pre-deployment training and from briefings down their chains of command that are a result of operational planning that has taken HS considerations into account. Because deployments are naturally dynamic, the analysis of HS problems is ongoing as engagement by forces with local populations and other actors continually feed into and refine the operational environment picture.[25] Service members' awareness of HS dynamics is a critical component to understanding the operational environment, which is the foundation for every mission.

The way in which service members can "**Respond**" to potential HS risks is contingent upon the circumstances and their mission. Ultimately, they must use their best judgment to apply the guidance provided by JSP 985. [26]

All interviewees emphasised that in an MSHT scenario, the MOD is not the lead agency. However, they do have a role to play. While service members are trained on the 4Rs, they are not counter-MSHT or policing experts. Going beyond the 4Rs risks compromising their mission and greater harm to potential victims. There is a balance to be achieved:

> "If people are injured you've got to intervene for their safety. It is British Army values to make sure you do the right thing at the right time, BUT you are not the agency to deal with this, don't get carried away and start investigating and gathering evidence and all that. Think about the local police, you've got to think about International Red Cross, or other NGOs that would be in a better position to help and support someone. Because we've got to carry on with whatever the mission is - and what I'm very aware of is that we wouldn't want this as a distraction. So, we've got to find that balance between making sure we do the right thing, but recognizing we are not the agency to take this forward."

The last two Rs help service members to achieve the balance of a further response to a potential HS risk with the understanding that they are not the lead agency.

"**Report**" enables internal action and "**Refer**" enables external action. "Armed Forces have a duty to report issues affecting the population up the chain of command to inform commanders, to further understanding of the operating environment and enable others to respond if needed or revise course of action if required. This requires an internal reporting mechanism and effective record keeping to ensure information is managed effectively."[27] Through this reporting process, higher headquarters staff are expected to refer cases to the agencies within the operational theatre that are equipped and qualified to respond. These agencies may be host nation government authorities or police forces, civil society organisations, international organizations, or non-governmental organisations.

Accurate referral mechanisms rely on the military formation's effective civil military cooperation (CIMIC) and/or civil military interaction (CMI) to develop a network of humanitarian relationships ahead of conflict. In a conflict zone, the key coordinating

agency for potential HS risks will be the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Whether through OCHA or a MOD developed humanitarian referral network, the act of referring not only allows those with the expertise access and aid to potential victims but also helps protect the humanitarian role of many agencies by limiting their involvement with the military.[28]

MSHT Training and Expertise Dissemination

The 4Rs provide service members with essential guidance on what to do in potential MSHT scenarios. For service members to effectively use the 4Rs they must have a basic understanding of human security and MSHT. MOD Headquarters operationalises human security training through three "tiers of capability."

> **Tier One: Human Security General Awareness:** Aimed at all MOD personnel, this tier will include mandatory training on human security fundamentals. The goal of this training is basic awareness so that everyone in the MOD can conduct the 4Rs. This training will ensure that defence personnel understand the importance of reporting.

> **Tier Two: Human Security Focal Point:** MOD personnel trained to identify human security risks and opportunities. They know how to escalate an issue but are not trained to the level of an Advisor.

> **Tier Three: Human Security Advisor:** MOD personnel who have successfully completed the Defence Academy's Defence Human Security in Operations Course and are up to date on their certification.[29]

The human security network throughout MOD is relatively new and its development is ongoing. The target for Tier One is mandatory general human security training for all MOD personnel, which is forthcoming. It is unknown at this time how often a service member will be required to train or by what mechanism. The Defence Academy recently launched a "Human Security Fundamentals" three-hour online course through the MOD's Defence Learning Environment e-learning platform. It is possible this training is a starting point for the mandatory course. As for focal points, this area of the MOD is the least mature, but progress is being made, particularly at the strategic level which expects to see a focal point network established within the next three to six months.

The network at Tier Three, Human Security Advisors, is the most established, with about 190 personnel trained.[30] While previously student selection to become HS Advisors was somewhat *ad hoc*, over 2024 defence mapping was conducted to determine where HS Advisors needed to be positioned throughout the MOD.

All Human Security Advisors must undergo the Defence Academy Human Security in Operations Course. There are currently approx. forty human security advisors per year through two intensive two-week programs. Ten of these students will be international participants, selected so the MOD can assist its partners and allies on their

development of human security knowledge. Upon successful completion of the course, students receive a qualification on their personal record for five years. To extend their certification, alumni must attend further training.

An integral part of the human security network is the Outreach Group. While all Human Security Advisors receive the same two-week training, those in Outreach Group add to this certification significant human security-related experience both in and out of the military. Outreach Group consists primarily of military reservists and specialists who are: "…well-connected, well-informed, or have significant positions across government and society." Outreach Group functions as a think tank for the MOD focus on three foundational pillars of: human security, stabilisation, and civil-military interaction. Outreach Group is often described as the "go-to unit" for human security issues.

Outreach Group members deploy with troops to assist in planning and operations, conduct training, and respond to requests for information from units throughout the MOD on human security issues. They regularly train new officers at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Its tasks include responding to requests for information by units deploying, conducting specialised country-specific training, and providing expertise on deployments. The group includes corporate risk analysts, undersea piping specialists, utility experts, police, leaders in government, society and social work and more—all with perspectives to help analyse risk and solve problems for commanders to ultimately help "win the war and the peace."

Case Study 2: United States Department of Defense (DoD)

The U.S. case study offers valuable insights into how allied defence personnel address CTIP, particularly through structured training and operational integration. MOD could benefit from increased collaboration with the DoD on CTIP training initiatives. Specifically, the MOD could consider engaging with the USINDOPACOM Office of WPS in the development of maritime and tactical-level standard operating procedures. Additionally, collaboration between the MOD and the DoD's CTIP Program Management Office could support the exchange of specialised training resources and strengthen overall counter-trafficking capabilities.

Part 1: Metacognition

Terms and Definitions

The United States government uses the language of "trafficking in persons" and "human trafficking" interchangeably.[31] The term "slavery" is used less often in U.S. as compared with the U.K. In the U.S., "trafficking in persons" is viewed as "a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children."[32] The U.S. primarily recognises two "severe forms of trafficking in persons," sex trafficking and labour trafficking.[33] The U.S. model uses a three-element framework in its definitions: A trafficker must have 1. Actions, 2. Means, and 3. Purpose. With one exception, if a victim is younger than eighteen, and is used for a commercial sex act, no proof of means, that is, "force, fraud, or coercion", is necessary.[34] According to national law:

> **Sex trafficking** is the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age. (22 U.S.C. § 7102(11)(A)).

> **Forced labor** is the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. (22 U.S.C. § 7102(11)(B)).[35]

These definitions are illustrated with the 'actions, means and purpose' framework:

Actions, Means, Purpose Model

A third definition of human trafficking that is relevant to the U.S. military is "child soldier." The following definition is included within US Department of Defense training. The term child soldier is defined in the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 as:

· Any person under 18 years of age who takes direct part in hostilities as a member of governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces;
· Any person under 18 years of age who has been compulsorily recruited into governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces;
· Any person under 15 years of age who has been voluntarily recruited into governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces; or
· Any person under 18 years of age who has been recruited or used in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the armed forces of a state.[36]

Policy Integration

The Trafficking Victim Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) was the first comprehensive federal law on human trafficking in the United States. The TVPA is built upon three pillars: prevention, protection, and prosecution. One of the most notable prevention measures was the creation of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons in the US State Department. Each year this office is required to publish a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report which provides a global assessment of each national government's anti-trafficking policies along the measures of prevention, protection, and prosecution.[37] The 2024 report covered 188 countries and continues to be the world's most comprehensive assessment of human trafficking.[38] The power behind the TIP report lies in the reporting mechanism used to analyse the anti-trafficking policies of each country.

The TIP reports use a tiered system: Tier 1 is the highest and governments with this score meet minimum standards of the TVPA; Tier 2 governments are making significant efforts towards the TVPA minimum standards, but do not yet meet them; Tier 2 Watch List countries meet the Tier 2 definition but ether have an estimated significant number or significantly increasing number of severe forms of trafficking victims, and/or the government has failed to show increasing efforts from the previous years to combat TIP; Tier 3 is the lowest rank and applies to governments that do not

meet minimum TVPA standards and are not working towards them. A country that is ranked at the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years and continues not to progress automatically drops to Tier 3 unless the Secretary of State waives the downgrade, which can only be done once and requires credible evidence of renewed efforts to combat TIP. These rankings are tied to political and foreign aid, with countries on Tier 3 subject to restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance unless waived by the U.S. President.[39]

Although there are arguments as to potential bias in TIP report rankings,[40] they have been shown to increase anti-trafficking efforts around the globe. A study of 8,500 diplomatic cables on human trafficking from 2000-2010, found that countries were very concerned with their rankings, and subsequent reputation, compared to similar countries, and were more likely to pass anti-trafficking laws to try and improve their score.[41] While the TIP Reports are an important part of understanding U.S. government action to combat trafficking in persons in and of itself, when focusing on the Department of Defense (DoD), the TIP reports are one factor that may shape security cooperation opportunities with partner militaries on combating this issue. The TIP reports can also be used as a tool to provide information to service members on the human trafficking risks within countries where they are deployed.

The TVPA is the foundational policy informing each U.S. government department's role in combating human trafficking. For the DoD, the necessity to combat TIP escalated in March 2002, when a television news report showed U.S. Army Military Police patrolling outside brothels and bars where women were sex trafficked near U.S. military base Camp Casey, South Korea. The investigation identified the victims as women who had been trafficked within South Korea and from the Philippines and Russian Federation. Outraged by the report, thirteen members of Congress wrote to the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfield, in May 2002 demanding an investigation.[42] In response to this request, inspections were initiated domestically and abroad.

In December 2002, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 22 declared "…a 'zero-tolerance' policy regarding Untied States Government employees and contractor personnel representing the United States abroad who engage in trafficking in persons."[43] The directive also called on federal agencies to increase and coordinate their efforts to combat TIP, and advised coordination across the U.S. government and the development of applicable training.[44] The DoD Office of the Inspector General completed their series of investigations on DoD efforts to combat human trafficking in South Korea, Bosnia, and Kosovo in 2003. Three years later, the Office of the Inspector General published a robust evaluation on DoD combating trafficking in persons (CTIP) efforts throughout the services and at several geographic commands to include a second evaluation in South Korea.

Concurrent with the investigations, by 2005, several key changes concerning CTIP were made within the DoD. By executive order, the Uniform Code of Military Justice[45] criminalised patronising a prostitute, with the maximum possible punishment of dishonourable discharge, confinement for one year, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.[46] The DoD became the first federal agency to require training on CTIP,

beginning with its deploying personnel.[47] With NSPD 22 as the model, the DoD also worked with NATO to establish their zero tolerance police on TIP. To develop and oversee CTIP training and further implementation of the NSPD 22[48], the Combating Trafficking in Persons Program Management Office (CTIP PMO) was developed in 2006.[49] Today, the CTIP PMO continues its original mandate to develop policy, training, awareness materials, and coordinate interagency and intra-agency CTIP efforts.[50]

In addition to the TVPA for the U.S. government and work of the CTIP PMO in the DoD, the national Women, Peace, and Security agenda also plays a role in CTIP policy execution. Like the United Kingdom, the United States also has a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) National Action Plan (NAP) modelled on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). The US was the first country in the world to develop a comprehensive law on WPS with its NAP passed in 2017.[51] The DoD released its first WPS Strategic Framework Implementation Plan (SFIP) in 2020 and updated it in 2024. Each SFIP outlined three defense objectives, the first is internally focused on the DoD representing the values of WPS, the second on insuring DoD operations, activities, and investments domestically and abroad promote WPS principles, and the third on working with allies and partners to foster global WPS. The 2024 SFIP describes one of DoD's WPS roles is to apply a gender analysis to human security threats, to include trafficking in persons. The framework requires awareness across the "Total Force" or all DoD personnel on WPS and requires the formation of a deployable Gender Advisory Workforce.[52]

The key informant interviews for this report were conducted when the WPS program within the DoD was active. However, under the current U.S. presidential administration, the WPS program was cancelled on April 29, 2025.[53] Despite recent changes within the U.S. government, WPS continues to be a policy implemented throughout the world with aims to reduce human rights violations, prevent violence and conflict, and further national, regional, and international security objectives.[54] There are currently 113 countries with a WPS National Action Plan, including both the United States and the United Kingdom. Integrating a WPS perspective is essential and increasingly relevant across all mission environments. In the context of the DoD case study, the focus is specifically on its value in helping defense personnel better understand, prevent, and combat trafficking in persons.

CTIP PMO and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Office of WPS Perspectives: Understanding CTIP Challenges and their Importance to Defense Personnel

To understand the ways in which the DoD combats trafficking in persons, it is important to understand the initiatives and requirements by both WPS and CTIP personnel. The CTIP PMO primarily approaches its work from the perspective of preventing service members involvement in trafficking in persons. The office was created in the aftermath of national news coverage on U.S. service member connection to human trafficking in South Korea. While the link between the U.S. military and TIP came to light internationally in 2002, one study estimates that one million Korean women were sexually exploited by U.S. service members throughout the six decades leading up to the news story. The same study found that U.S. military bases in South Korea formed an international hub for sex trafficking, with women

from the Asia Pacific, Eurasia and South Korea recruited and trafficked to bars around the bases in South Korea and to massage parlours in the United States. U.S. service members reportedly were involved in the demand for victims of sex trafficking and even as traffickers; particularly, trafficking women through "sham marriages."[55]

Service member involvement in TIP continues to be an issue. In 2018, the DoD investigated 141 trafficking in persons or related cases. TIP incidents have involved service members, DoD contractors, foreign national employees of the DoD, dependents (spouses and children of service members), civilian employees, and indirect hires. From 2011-2021 DoD members were involved as buyers, traffickers, and victims of trafficking in persons.[56]

Although the U.S. military is not unique in its connection to TIP crimes, following the international attention of the cases in Korea, the DoD is unique in both the information available to the public on these crimes and the robust infrastructure in place within the DoD to combat human trafficking. While it is outside the scope of this report to assess the effectiveness of the CTIP PMO and overall DoD efforts to combat this issue, it is worth noting some of the history and recent events that informs DoD CTIP training and its relevance for the DoD. The CTIP PMO makes clear that their primary focus when developing training and awareness for the DoD is working to prevent service member involvement in TIP cases.

In addition to adhering to DoD wide training and messaging requirements from the CTIP PMO, USINDOPACOM takes a more comprehensive approach to CTIP. The WPS team approaches CTIP work with three elements: a WPS lens, consideration of broader security implications of TIP, and application of the four core principles that guide all their activities. One USINDOPACOM WPS CTIP representative noted:

> "We…look at trafficking [through] WPS because we understand that men, women, boys and girls are all trafficked differently and for different purposes and the data supports that."

Taking a WPS approach to CTIP means taking a deeper look at the root causes of human trafficking, which helps promote effective strategies to combat and prevent it. Applying a WPS lens analyses the roles of men, women, boys, and girls throughout the spectrum of conflict. A WPS perspective places victims at the forefront and ensures a trauma-informed and survivor-centric approach that is sensitive to intersectional vulnerabilities.[57] The DoD WPS analysis identifies vulnerabilities such as age and sex further intersected with cultural norms and beliefs; men and women's roles, responsibilities and time use; laws, policies, regulations and institutions; access to assets; and patterns of power and decision making.[58]

The first U.S. DoD WPS Advisor Course took place in 2018 at USINDOPACOM.[59] During this landmark course the connection between WPS and CTIP was seen as critical.[60] As part of this training, case studies focus on the increase of human trafficking following natural disasters in the Indo-pacific region. While women and girls were disproportionally affected following both the Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in

2013 and after the Nepal earthquake in April 2015, in Nepal, women also played a critical albeit underrecognised role in relief and recovery efforts.[61]

In conjunction with a WPS approach, USINDOPACOM's Office of WPS considers "...CTIP as part of the broader spectrum of violence, against and towards certain groups," maintaining that the $150 billion industry of human trafficking and Modern slavery is a key "driver of instability" that funds destabilising activities and poses threats to U.S. military forces.[62] The framework of "drivers of instability" is a primary way in which USINDOPACOM WPS articulates to defense audiences the risks TIP pose to military forces and their operations. Human trafficking is often linked to weapons and drug trafficking, which are further drivers of instability.

Lastly, the USINDOPACOM WPS team, recognising the dynamic and complex operating environment of the Indo-Pacific region, ensures their CTIP approach is as comprehensive as possible. USINDOPACOM advises that best practice security cooperation implementation include CTIP from a multinational standpoint and utilize the four principled approach they apply to all their activities: across whole of enterprise, whole of government, whole of society, and take a localised approach.

Part 2: Training and Operationalisation

Training and Operationalization Fundamentals

The CTIP PMO is responsible for developing policy, courses, and awareness materials on CTIP for the entire DoD. While CTIP training requirements have shifted for DoD over the years[63], the most current mandate, which applies to all executive branch personnel[64], is that all new personnel must be trained, and refresher training is required every two years.[65] Individual DoD units can choose to tailor their general awareness and refresher CTIP trainings, but must include the following standardized learning objectives established by the CTIP PMO:

1. What constitutes trafficking in persons (TIP), utilizing the term "severe forms of trafficking in persons" as defined in Section 7102 of Title 22, U.S.C.
2. Human trafficking concerns in DoD including prevalence in DoD and how human trafficking can affect mission readiness
3. Why and how TIP occurs and who is involved in TIP
4. The basic characteristics of human trafficking crimes and methods to combat TIP
5. TIP laws and policies
6. Reporting procedures for alleged TIP violations including their role in combating human trafficking[66]

Expanding on the last objective, one thing that makes the DoD unique is the guidance on reporting mechanisms. DoD personnel are trained to report suspected abuses through their chain of command or to the Inspector General. The DoD Inspector General has a website and phone hotlines, along with local offices at many installations.[67]

The CTIP PMO has developed a series of online courses and specialized training for DoD personnel to meet their training requirements. In addition to considering the audience for CTIP training in development of their courses, the CTIP PMO office also takes a survivor-centric approach. They work with survivors to help make scenarios within their courses realistic and seek advice from survivors on what can be improved. For example, one survivor provided feedback that led to the newest specialised training, which is designed for recruiting personnel. The CTIP PMO website also includes a "Survivor Voices of Human Trafficking" page with stories from survivors of sex and labour trafficking and child soldiering, many with a connection to the DoD.[68]

CTIP Training and Expertise Dissemination

For CTIP training and expertise dissemination the CTIP PMO office provides the DoD with online training for CTIP general awareness and refresher courses as well as the following online specialized trainings:
- DoD Education Activity[69] CTIP Training for teachers, administrators, and school staff;
- CTIP Investigative Professionals Training for military police, criminal investigators, inspector general personnel, and other military or DoD civilian law enforcement personnel who conduct inquiries
- CTIP Acquisition Personnel Training for DoD employees who are responsible for monitoring contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements
- Leadership CTIP Resource
- CTIP Chaplains Training
- CTIP Healthcare Personnel Training
- CTIP Judge Advocate/Legal Counsel Course
- CTIP Military Recruiters Training

As of 2024, all Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DoD Component heads are required to report CTIP training completion numbers to the CTIP PMO. These reports are submitted through annual CTIP Self-Assessments, which also request information on reported trafficking in persons (TIP) cases and any CTIP-related accomplishments.[70] The CTIP PMO oversees access to and the collection of mandatory training data. However, it does not have the capacity to develop specialized training tailored to specific service components (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force), mission types, deployment locations, or operational needs.

During engagements with combatant commands, the CTIP PMO provides the annual Trafficking in Persons report and highlights Tier 3 and Tier 2 Watch List countries relevant to each command's area of responsibility. It is then up to the individual commands to incorporate this information into regional CTIP training or related initiatives. Likewise, the CTIP PMO confirms that there are no Department of Defense–level requirements for pre-deployment CTIP training; instead, the decision to mandate such training is left to the discretion of each combatant command.

USINDOPACOM provides one example of a command that supplements CTIP PMO training. The USINDOPACOM Office of WPS ensures newcomer orientations include

TIP considerations relevant to the Indo-Pacific and they include CTIP training within the area and country briefings that are required for service members prior to travel. INDOPACOM WPS also provides their personnel with a list of offsite locations where they are prohibited from going due to TIP risks. To further coordinate and share information across the DoD and relevant law enforcement agencies, one expert interviewed for this report shared that they coordinate a CTIP Working Group, which shares lessons learned and best practices.

Beyond internal CTIP work, the USINDOPACOM Office of WPS's application of WPS to CTIP with partner nations is exemplified in the workshop they hosted with the Pacific Forum in Malaysia. In the 2023 workshop, they designed two TIP scenarios for an audience of military personnel, government agency leads, and civil society representatives. One of the scenarios was based on military land capabilities and the other in a maritime situation. Following the scenarios, they facilitated discussion groups to capture ongoing challenges related to TIP and smuggling of migrations (SOM) and recommendations. One expert interviewed describes the impactful coordination the WPS team facilitated:

> "…the people that we were able to have in the room had never spoken to each other. That's what's really good about our situation is that we were able to bring the military in along with other…community or NGOs or programs that had never had that opportunity to communicate with each other…I think that was an A-HA moment for us, that we were able to bring units of people and organizations together that had never had an opportunity to speak to each other, or to figure out what they can learn from each other, how they can help resource one another."

Throughout the workshop in Malaysia, the WPS approach on CTIP enabled a deeper understanding of TIP and SOM challenges; promoted efforts to avoid re-traumatization of victims and to protect frontline workers from emotional trauma; and enabled the development of comprehensive recommendations to support and strengthen efforts in Malaysia to combat TIP and SOM.[71] Through their own CTIP training and security cooperation initiatives, the USINDOPACOM team demonstrates the benefit, and they would argue necessity, of applying a WPS approach to CTIP.

Case Study 3: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Overall, when working with NATO, CTHB training and policy discussions are best focused within the broader human security framework. While the MOD recently released their online human security training, this is something still under development at NATO. Given that NATO and MOD conceptions of human security are similar, there should be collaboration between the Defence Academy and NATO to further assist NATO in their online training development.

NATO is a transatlantic alliance of countries from Europe and North America. While originally consisting of 12 founding member countries in 1949, the alliance consists of 32 member countries today. NATO is both a political and military alliance that aims to promote democracy, cooperation, and the prevention of conflict. If, however, peaceful resolution of disputes is not possible, NATO can take military actions to conduct crisis-management operations. Military action is taken through a UN mandate or implementation of collective defence, Article 5 in NATO's founding treaty.[72]

Part 1: Metacognition

Terms and Definitions

NATO defines "Trafficking in Human Beings" (THB) as follows:

> "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat of use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation."

NATO further defines "exploitation" as, "the exploitation of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs." The policy also leaves room for expanded definitions of "exploitation" stating, "Other forms of exploitation beyond the ones mentioned...such as for the purposes of forced begging or for criminal activities, shall also be covered by this Policy." Like UK and U.S. definitions, in the case of a child, no "means" are necessary to establish the crime of THB. NATO's definition is also consistent with the UN definition of "Trafficking in Persons."[73]

Policy Integration

NATO developed its first policy on "Combating Trafficking in Human Beings" (CTHB) in 2004 with commitments focused on response, mitigation, and prevention. Its latest policy, "NATO Policy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings," was developed at the 2023 Vilnius Summit and incorporates both human security and women, peace,

and security approaches. The policy highlights that while anyone can be a target of THB, women and girls are the majority of detected survivors and victims.[74] As a political and military alliance, NATO highlights the destabilising risks of THB,

> "[THB] fuels and is fuelled by corruption, terrorism and organised crime and exacerbates situations of conflict and instability. Conflict and instability increase the risk of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Trafficking in human beings can compromise efforts to secure peace and stabilization in conflict and post-conflict environments and has the potential to weaken and destabilize governments' ability to protect citizens."[75]

The 2023 policy also describes NATO's concern that THB risks have escalated from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Responding, preventing, and combating trafficking in human beings not only fights for the human rights of victims and survivors, but also enhances NATO's operational effectiveness and credibility. The policy discusses measures to counter the demand for THB, mitigate risk within NATO supply chains, and aims to ensure human trafficking considerations are integrated within military planning. It highlights the importance of ensuring "…measures are gender-responsive, age-sensitive, victim-centred, trauma-informed and that human trafficking considerations are integrated into military planning."[76]

For NATO personnel the policy provides guiding principles if they encounter a potential THB situation and reiterates NATO's Code of Conduct and similar policies aimed at ensuring NATO personnel are not themselves contributing to THB. The policy culminates with education and training, which includes mandatory training for all deployed NATO personnel and the mandate to, upon request, provide CTHB training to security forces of host nations.[77]

NATO's CTHB policy is both separate and integrated within its policy and prioritisation of human security. In 2022 both NATO's "Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles" and its "Strategic Concept" were developed. NATO's human security work focuses on five areas: combating trafficking in human beings; preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence; children and armed conflict; protection of civilians; and cultural property protection. The "Strategic Concept," NATO's primary strategic policy, underlines human security as central to its role in crisis prevention and management, and promotes human security integration across all NATO tasks.[78] Similar to the MOD, NATO's policy on human security is the overarching mandate, one part of which is combating trafficking in human beings.

NATO Perspectives: Understanding CTHB Challenges and their Importance to Defence Personnel

NATO's agenda for human security integration aims to ensure a coherent approach incorporating all five themes throughout the Alliance's core tasks of: deterrence and defence; cooperative security; and crisis prevention and management.[79] It is important to understand that from a NATO perspective, the human security mandate is broad in and of itself with five thematic areas, and that human security is one of five agendas requiring integration across all NATO tasks. [80]

At the tactical level, a human security approach is a "warfighting and strategic enabler" that considers short term kinetic goals in context of long-term military campaigns. NATO training links human security to international humanitarian law and highlights protection of civilians to illustrate globally understood concepts that resonate with military personnel from member states. Arguments on the morals, ethics, and political ramifications also resonate with defence personnel on NATO missions.

Although the terminology of "human security" is relatively new, the concepts underlying it are not. NATO and its member state militaries have a wealth of experience. When the human security policy was developed, the committee received a "food for thought paper for allies," which comprised an evaluation of lessons learned from restricted periodic mission reports of NATO missions. This practice is common within NATO and encourages the use of tactical on the ground lessons to inform strategic guidance. According to a NATO representative, it is a constant challenge to translate strategic guidance to tactical level action and these papers are one mechanism to shorten the distance between the two. The nature of NATO presents further challenges for closing this gap. While NATO presents standards, guidance, and provides training opportunities, it is ultimately up to each nation how they apply human security within their operations.

Part 2: Training and Operationalisation

Training and Operationalisation Fundamentals

For NATO missions, training is the responsibility of troop contributing nations. For CTHB training, all our key informants have a similar fundamental principle—that defence personnel are not the lead actors in potential THB scenarios. However, CTHB training and action is still vital to NATO: "While noting that NATO is not the lead responder, combatting, responding to and preventing trafficking in human beings contributes to enhancing NATO's operational effectiveness and credibility."[81] NATO provides the following guidelines to for its personnel to respond to potential THB scenarios:

a. In accordance with a gender-responsive, age-sensitive, victim-centered and trauma-informed approach, respect victims and survivors as individuals and their informed choice;
b. All victims and survivors will be treated fairly, respectfully, equally, with dignity and without discrimination;
c. Do no harm in implementing this Policy: no action should be taken that could worsen the situation or trauma of a victim or survivor;
d. Do not interview victims or survivors, unless trained to do so;
e. Respect privacy and confidentiality of victims and survivors;
f. Protect against retaliation: the confidentiality and dignity of all those involved in an allegation should be protected and respected, including victims and survivors, complainants and whistle-blowers;

g. Seek consent from victims and survivors to follow-up on reports and respect their privacy and confidentiality, ensuring data protection and security;

h. Provide access to services (if the victim or survivor wishes) immediately after the concern is raised and not pending the outcome of an investigation or any other processes.

In extremis situations, when other actors are unable to access survivors and victims, NATO defence personnel are advised to where possible provide emergency first response and assist with referral.

CTHB Training and Expertise Dissemination

While NATO cannot mandate training for its member states or their militaries, all civilian and defence personnel serving in a NATO position are mandated to take CTHB online training. NATO offers human security and CTHB training opportunities at its centres of excellence, in NATO exercises, and through online training. At the UK Defence Academy, the Human Security in Operations Course encourages its students to complete several NATO online courses, to include its CTHB training. NATO is currently developing an online course on human security to include all five thematic areas, which will be another resource for member states when conducting their own training. Beyond tools for its member states, NATO conducts human security work with its partners in individually tailored partnership programmes (ITPP). A NATO representative described how ITPPs now include a chapter on human security that details goals linked to all five policy areas 'exporting NATO standards.'

Case Study 4: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Given the complexity of coordinating counter-trafficking efforts across 57 sovereign states, the OSCE has developed a notably coherent and effective approach to CTHB, including the use of simulation-based training and tactical-level guidance. The MOD could benefit from closer collaboration with the OSR/CTHB. MOD could explore opportunities to incorporate OSCE-led simulation-based training exercises into its own counter-MSHT programmes, particularly at the national and operational levels. Additionally, the MOD should consider involving the OSR/CTHB in the development of tactical-level standard operating procedures, with particular attention to scenarios in the maritime domain.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organisation with 57 participating States and traces its origins to the Cold War. The OSCE takes a comprehensive approach to security, focusing its work on three "dimensions": the politico-military; the economic and environmental; and the human dimension. It addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including human rights, human trafficking, arms control, democratization, policing strategies, and counterterrorism.[82] The OSCE helps to build trust between participating states with co-operative efforts on crisis management, conflict prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation.[83]

Part 1: Metacognition

Terms and Definitions

The OSCE uses the UN Palermo Protocol to define trafficking in human beings (THB) as "...the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by the threat or use of force, deception, or other means, for the purpose of exploitation." The OSCE, like each of the other three case studies, defines THB as requiring "acts," "means," and "purpose."[84] One exception is when a child is the victim; there is no requirement for the presence of "means" for the crime to be considered THB.[85] The OSCE definition applies to all those employed within the organisation and serves as a model for Combating THB (CTHB) efforts with participating States. While the OSCE often works with participating States to help develop and enhance their national CTHB legislation, and offers guidance and recommendations in its publications, it is ultimately up to each State how they implement and define this issue.

Policy Integration

In 2003 the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) was created and the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings was published. The OSR/CTHB assists participating States with their development and implementation of CTHB policies as

specified in the Action Plan. The core focus of effective implementation of national CTHB policy is defined by the 4Ps:

- **Prevention:** including addressing root causes and awareness-raising.
- **Prosecution:** including investigation and adjudication.
- **Protection:** of victims' rights, including assistance and compensation.
- **Partnerships:** co-operation with international organizations and other external partners, including on issues related to law enforcement, National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs) and joint work between public institutions and the private sector. [86]

The OSR/CTHB publishes an annual report on their efforts within the OSCE and with participating States. Captured in the most recent report are the "Decalogue of anti-trafficking action," the ten measures the former Special Representative Valiant Richey identified over two years of meeting with participating States as the "most promising measures" to build effective CTHB national policies.[87] In addition, the OSR/CTHB serves as the focal point for all OSCE CTHB efforts, promotes CTHB as a cross-dimensional issue, and ensures coordination of CTHB across all three dimensions of OSCE work (i.e. the politico-military; the economic and environmental; and the human).[88]

OSCE Perspectives: Understanding CTHB Challenges and their Importance to Frontline Personnel

The fundamental perspective of the OSCE is that THB is a crime that intersects all three dimensions of OSCE work and is instrumental not only to frontline personnel and in regional security efforts, but in all that the OSCE does. According to former OSCE Secretary General Helga Maria Schmid:

> "...combating human trafficking remains a priority for the OSCE. And given the complexity and cross-dimensional nature of the problem, the OSCE is ideally placed to address it through its broad membership and its comprehensive and co-operative approach to security, which allows us to work on hard security matters, on economic issues and on questions related to human rights."[89]

For example, in 2023 alone, the OSCE OSR/CTHB worked with 39 participating States. The Office's efforts included providing recommendations on ways to improve national CTHB work, conducting capacity-building, and addressing challenges in prevention and combating labour trafficking in supply chains and in traffickers' use of technology. The Office facilitated multiple efforts to increase coordination and partnerships on CTHB. Examples include four regional workshops with participation from 30 participating States on the links between trafficking and technology.

The OSR/CTHB collaborates regularly with the EU. Last year it focused their joint work and advocacy on both the issues of trafficker use of technology and on the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia's war against the Ukraine.[90] To date, the Office has led 29 workshops with participating States to prevent the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine from turning into a greater human trafficking crisis.[91]

When asked about the conceptualization of and importance of CTHB policy within the OSCE, especially as compared to the "human security" framework within the MOD, an interviewee said:

> "If we look at economic and environmental impacts, there is clearly an intersection between human trafficking and corruption. Corruption is dealt with within the second dimension, which is environmental and economic. This includes the nexus between human trafficking patterns and climate change, for example. Also, making sure that military personnel are not complicit with human trafficking. That's why it's clearly broader than just a human dimension in the OSCE sense of the word. It's still about human security, but…within our three baskets, it's broader than just the human dimension. That's why our work is cross dimensional."

The organisational and individual perspectives gathered on OSCE CTHB policy consistently described their efforts as cross-dimensional, reflecting the complexity of the crimes themselves.

Part 2: Training and Operationalisation

Training and Operationalisation Fundamentals

OSCE's counter-trafficking efforts applies a strong victim- and survivor-centred approach, emphasising two key principles: the "non-punishment principle" and the "social path." The non-punishment principle, supported by both the EU and OSCE, ensures that victims of trafficking are not prosecuted or penalised for crimes they were compelled to commit as a direct result of their exploitation."[92]

The non-punishment principle was published by the European Union in its 2011 directive "on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims." The OSCE described the principle as an "essential element of a human rights-based approach" in its 2013 publication on policy and legislative recommendations to implement the non-punishment principle regarding victims of THB.[93]

In addition to training on the necessity of non-punishment toward THB victims, the OSCE promotes the concept of the "social path" as a necessary tool to implement effective victim and survivor-centred protection measures. The "social path" is the concept that victims and survivors should receive assistance without discrimination; their protection and support should not be contingent upon cooperation with the criminal justice process. [94] This concept was formalized in 2013 within the "Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings: One Decade Later." Its application is explained in length in a 2023 OSCE report entitled "Putting Victims First."[95] The "social path" is a concept upheld in international standards within the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the OSCE.

Beyond prioritising the protection and human rights of victims and survivors of THB, the "social path" has many advantages. There are more prosecutions for THB crimes, victims can share information with law enforcement without contacting them directly, and there's increased trust within the national social protection systems.[96] As former OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for CTHB Valiant Richey describes, "[The social path] is a path to victim recovery that, if implemented effectively, will ultimately lead to reduced vulnerabilities, fewer re-trafficking cases, more credibility of State protection systems, and safer communities."[97]

While the concept of the "social path" is widely accepted as an international standard, its application is often far from meeting its goals to provide unconditional access to services for victims of THB. In many Participating States, victims of trafficking receive short-term support during a 30–90 day "recovery and reflection" period. After this, they are often expected to testify; if they are not ready, non-national victims are typically repatriated. However, this often returns them to the same vulnerable conditions that led to their exploitation. As one interviewee said:

> "I've talked to survivors, and they were nationals of that country, survivors of child trafficking. It took them five years to open up and tell their story. Can you imagine what would have happened to them if they had been returned? They wouldn't be alive anymore. But unfortunately, this has been a practice since the adoption of the Palermo Protocol. THB is considered as a very specific crime but is often treated as any other crime, with victims often bearing the burden of proof."

There is a false assumption believed in some jurisdictions, that if there is no victim testifying there cannot be prosecution. Victimless prosecutions in the UK, for example, demonstrate how this assumption is wrong. Through the "social path," information from a victim's interview without direct law enforcement contact, can be used to aid in prosecution of traffickers.

CTHB Training and Expertise Dissemination

The OSCE has adopted a flexible and evolving approach to counter-trafficking in human beings (CTHB) training, tailored to mission needs and audience size. In response to operational challenges, training shifted from in-person instruction to a structured program targeting Gender Focal Points (GFPs) and Human Dimension Officers: the roles most likely to encounter trafficking cases. This included a "Training of Trainers" course, allowing GFPs to disseminate knowledge across missions. To institutionalise learning, CTHB modules were incorporated into the OSCE staff induction programme, making CTHB training mandatory for all new personnel. Additionally, the OSCE launched simulation-based, multiagency training in 2016, using live role-players to simulate real THB cases, to enhance practical skills in identifying and responding to trafficking along migration routes.

Since its pilot, the OSCE has conducted numerous simulation-based training events for hundreds of practitioners involving almost every OSCE participating State and OSCE partner for co-operation. These exercises have been conducted in international (English and Russian), regional, national, and conflict settings. The simulation-based

training exercises are scalable and can be conducted "on a grand scale, even with helicopters," or on a smaller scale. In 2019 OSCE captured its methodology and lessons learned in a handbook to enable replication of their simulation-based training for CTHB. According to this handbook, the primary objectives and advantages to this type of training include:

1. To foster multi-agency work;
2. To improve identification of human trafficking cases in mixed migration flows;
3. To improve/enhance the referral of trafficked persons to assistance providers;
4. To provide victim-centred protection and assistance;
5. To investigate human trafficking criminal cases using a proactive approach, including addressing any transnational dimensions. [98]

In addition to the above objectives, the simulation-based training tool provides a collaborative way to find better solutions to CTHB.

Conclusion

This report presents a comprehensive foundation for understanding and enhancing Defence's role in addressing human security and countering-MSHT within military operations. Drawing on the insights of key defence experts and the strategies of allied defence organisations, it highlights both the strengths of current UK defence efforts and opportunities for further advancement.

This report explored how MOD has demonstrated significant progress through its human security framework, operational tools, and the expertise of dedicated personnel and how this momentum could be built up by expanding the role and joint capability of the Outreach Group, increasing the number of trained Human Security Advisors, and allocating targeted resources to human security and counter-MSHT training and tools. It also highlighted the value of strengthening collaboration with partner and allied defence organisations to further reinforce the leadership in this area.

The case studies demonstrated how allied defence organisations integrate counter-trafficking into their operations and training. The U.S. Department of Defense highlighted the importance of structured CTIP training and operational integration, offering opportunities for the MOD to enhance maritime and tactical-level procedures and exchange specialised training materials. NATO's approach showed the benefit of embedding counter-trafficking within broader human security frameworks, with potential for the MOD to support NATO's developing efforts through collaboration. The OSCE case study illustrated the effectiveness of multinational coordination, showcasing simulation-based training and tactical guidance as models the MOD could adopt to further strengthen its counter-MSHT programmes.

Throughout this research, the consistent message from allied defence institutions is clear: the most effective responses to MSHT are built on strong institutional frameworks, rigorous training, interagency coordination, and meaningful partnerships. The MOD is well-positioned to lead in this domain, provided it continues to adapt, invest in expertise, and draw on the strengths of its partners.

Ultimately, this report contributes to a broader body of work aimed at enabling a coordinated, informed, and proactive defence-led response to modern slavery and human trafficking. Aligning training, policy, and operational practice within the MOD, and in cooperation with allies, will be critical to meeting the evolving challenges of MSHT in today's complex security environment.

Annex A: Comparative lessons and key insights

Below is a comparison of how MSHT is conceptualised and operationalised within defence frameworks across the UK, United States, NATO, and the OSCE.

It explores two key dimensions: metacognition which is the strategic framing, terminology, and policy integration of MSHT, and training which is the practical implementation of awareness, prevention, and response mechanisms within military and security operations. By examining how each organisation defines, prioritises, and equips personnel to address MSHT, the analysis identifies strengths, gaps, and transferable practices.

The analysis highlights lessons learnt from international practice that MOD could draw on to continue to develop the UK's approach to tackling MSHT.

Metacognition (Conceptual Framework)

Aspect	UK (MOD)	US (DoD)	NATO	OSCE
Framework	MSHT is a cross-cutting theme within the Human Security policy (JSP 985). Uses a "Three Vantage Points" model to frame MSHT in terms of mission impact, adversary behaviour, and reinforcing the rules- based international order. .	MSHT addressed through a standalone Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) policy. Framed as a threat to mission readiness, national reputation, and insider threats. Focus on preventing service member involvement.	MSHT (called Trafficking in Human Beings) is part of NATO's Human Security agenda and Strategic Concept. Framed as a strategic and operational threat that undermines peace and stability.	MSHT (called Trafficking in Human Beings) is a cross-dimensional issue across all three OSCE security pillars (the politico-military; the economic and environmental). Framed as a human rights, security, and governance issue. Anchored in victim-centred and non-punitive principles for victims and survivors.

Terminology	Uses "Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking" (MSHT); aligns with UK law and NATO definitions from the Palermo Protocol. Adjusts language based on audience (e.g., "trafficking in human beings" in NATO/UN contexts).	Uses "Trafficking in Persons" (TIP); less emphasis on "slavery." Legal definitions focus on sex and labour trafficking and child soldiers. Uses Actions-Means-Purpose model.	Uses "Trafficking in Human Beings" (THB); aligned with UN Palermo Protocol definition. Includes broad definitions of exploitation.	Uses UN Palermo Protocol definition of Trafficking in Human Beings. Emphasises acts, means, purpose model, except for children where there is no requirement for 'means' to be considered THB. Applies non-punishment principle and social path for victim support.
Policy Integration	MSHT is embedded in Human Security policy (JSP 985) and supported by JSP 769 (Zero Tolerance to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse). Human Security is seen as a force multiplier and strategic imperative.	CTIP is a dedicated policy area with legal backing (Trafficking Victim Protection Act 2000). Previously Integrated with Women Peace and Security (WPS) but the WPS program was cancelled April 2025. DoD-wide training mandates.	Combating Trafficking in Human Beings policy is integrated into NATO's Human Security and Women Peace and Security (WPS) frameworks. Human Security is one of five cross-cutting agendas in NATO's Strategic Concept. Provides guidelines for staff if they encounter a potential THB situation. A human security approach.	Combating Trafficking in Human Beings is integrated across all OSCE dimensions. Led by the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings Supported by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Action Plan, and EU-aligned directives.
Key Insights	Emphasises mission legitimacy, moral responsibility, and strategic advantage.	Focus on preventing service members involvement,	Provides strategic coherence and guidance, but relies on member states for	Leads in policy coherence, victim-first approaches, and cross-sector coordination. Emphasises do no harm,

	Uses a humanising approach and promotes collaboration with allies.	protecting reputation, multinational cooperation and ensuring readiness. Uses survivor-informed and data-driven approaches.	implementation. Human Security is a strategic enabler and operational necessity.	non-punishment, and long-term victim support through the "social path" for prosecutions without victim contact.

Lessons for the UK MOD from International Partners – Metacognition

DoD:
- Establish a centralised policy office (like the CTIP Program Management Office) to coordinate MSHT efforts across defence.
- Incorporate survivor-informed and data-driven approaches into policy development and evaluation.

NATO:
- Embed MSHT more deeply into strategic planning and operational doctrine, aligning with NATO's Human Security agenda.
- Treat MSHT as a core operational concern, not just a legal or ethical issue.
- Conceptualise human security as a strategic enabler and operational necessity.

OSCE:
- Adopt a cross-dimensional approach that frames MSHT as both a human rights and security issue.
- Apply victim-centred principles, including:
  - The non-punishment principle (victims should not be penalised for crimes committed under coercion).
  - The "social path" (providing support without requiring victim cooperation in prosecutions).
- Promote ethical and trauma-informed policy frameworks that prioritise long-term victim support.

Training (Operationalising)

Aspect	UK (MOD)	US (DoD)	NATO	OSCE
Framework	Integrated within Human Security policy (JSP 985); uses "4Rs" (Recognise, Respond, Report, Refer); MSHT is one of six cross-cutting themes. As well as protection of civilians, Women, Peace and Security, integrity / countering corruption and cultural property protection.	Standalone Combating Trafficking In Person (CTIP) policy managed by CTIP Project Management Office; focused on preventing service member involvement and enhancing mission readiness. Somewhat driven by response to personnel's involvement in scandals of sex trafficking.	MSHT (called trafficking in Hum Beings) is one of five themes under Human Security; integrated into NATO's Strategic Concept; provides guidance but relies on implementation by troop contributing nations on NATO missions.	Cross-dimensional approach across three security pillars; led by Office of the Special Representative (OSR) /Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB) Grounded in victim-centred, trauma-informed, and non-punishment principles.
Training Structure	Three-tiered system: · Tier 1: General awareness (mandatory for all MoD personnel) · Tier 2: Human Security Focal Points (in development) · Tier 3: Human Security Advisors	Mandatory for all personnel (initial + biennial refresher); Specialised courses for educators, law enforcement, healthcare, military recruiters, legal practitioners, and chaplains.	Mandatory online CTHB training for civilian and defence NATO personnel; training guidance provided to member states; new Human Security course in development.	Induction training for all staff; Training programme for Gender Focal Points and Human Dimension Officers who are most likely to encounter trafficking cases. Including a train the trainer approach. Simulation-based training for multi-agency

	(certified via Defence Academy)			coordination with live role-players.
Delivery	• Relatively new approach in development by MoD Defence Academy's Outreach Group provides training and deployment support • Pre-deployment briefings • Online modules via Defence Learning Environment	• Online, scenario-based, survivor-informed training • Regional briefings (e.g., United states Indo-Pacific Combatant Command) • CTIP Working Group shares best practices	• Online training • NATO Centres of Excellence • NATO exercises • Member states responsible for national-level implementation • Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPP)	• In-person, online, and simulation-based training • Role-play scenarios • Regional and national exercises • Training adapted to mission and audience
Key Insights	Training is mission-integrated and supports operational effectiveness, legitimacy, and ethical conduct; feedback loops inform future missions.	Emphasis on accountability and tailored training; strong institutional support and survivor engagement to develop training.	Provides strategic guidance and standards; implementation depends on national forces; gender / age/ victim centered and trauma informed approach, aims to spread NATO good practice.	Leads in innovative, experiential training, dissemination of training through a train the trainer approach. Promotes multi-sector collaboration and victim-first approaches.

Lessons for the UK MOD from International Partners – Training and Operationalisation

DoD:
- Develop specialised training modules for high-risk roles such as:
    - Military recruiters
    - Healthcare providers
    - Law enforcement personnel
- Ensure training is survivor-informed and based on realistic scenarios.
    - Implement robust reporting mechanisms, such as direct access to Inspector General hotlines
- Emphasise the link between MSHT and mission readiness, insider threats, and national reputation.

NATO:
- Collaborate on joint training development, especially:
    - Online modules aligned with NATO's human security agenda
    - Shared standards and terminology
- Use NATO's model for a 'do no harm' and victim-centred approach.

OSCE:
- Adopt simulation-based training to prepare personnel for complex, real-world MSHT scenarios.
- Use a Training of Trainers model to scale expertise across units and commands.
- Emphasise victim-centred principles, including:
    - The "social path" (support without requiring victim cooperation in prosecutions)
- The non-punishment principle (victims should not be penalised for crimes committed under coercion)

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